Activity of the UN Security Council with the Aim of Restoring Stability in Kosovo in 1998-1999 by Szeląg, Paulina
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993 
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
MCSER Publishing-Rome,Italy 





Activity of the UN Security Council with the Aim of  
Restoring Stability in Kosovo in 1998-1999 
 
Paulina SzelĆg, PhD candidate 
 






The last ethnic conflict in the Balkans was ended on 10 June 1999. On the same day, the UN Security Council adopted 
resolution 1244, in which the Security Council announced their decision to deploy international civil and security presence in 
Kosovo, under United Nations auspices. Taking into account that the UN Security Council is responsible for maintaining 
international peace and security, there is a question what did the UN Security Council do to avoid the conflict in Kosovo in 
1999. The aim of the article is to find the answer to the question why the UN Security Council failed and why the NATO took the 





At the beginning of the 1990s, Europe did not see Kosovo as a future war zone. Politicians from the Western European 
countries regarded Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia and an element of Serbian national identity.1 What is more, in 
1991-1997, Kosovo was not directly involved in the Balkan conflict and nobody predicted that this might change in the 
nearest future.2 However, in 1992, the European Community attempted to discuss the problem of Kosovo. The 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) established a mission of long duration in this territory. Their 
efforts turned out insufficient.3 In addition, the Kosovo issue was not a part of peace negotiations in Dayton, which ended 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.4 It was evident that neither Europe nor the United States did undertake any strong 
effort to solve the problem in Kosovo, which then was only in its initial phase. 
Since the beginning of 1998, the situation in Kosovo had deteriorated. In that time, the province evolved into a 
zone of widespread fighting between Serbian and Albanian people. At this stage of the conflict, the international 
community was forced to take action in order to solve the problem of Kosovo. One of the subjects involved in 1998-1999 
in the process of stabilization in the province was the United Nations (UN). This article examines the engagement of the 
UN Security Council in solving the armed conflict in Kosovo. 
 
2. Actions taken by the UN Security Council to stop the violent escalation in Kosovo 
 
The first attempt of the UN Security Council to resolve the problem in the province took place in 1993. On 9 August 1993, 
the Security Council of the United Nations decided to establish resolution 855. In the document, the Security Council 
called upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to reconsider their refusal to allow the continuation of 
the activities of the CSCE mission of long duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. In addition, the government in 
Belgrade was encouraged to cooperate with the CSCE mission and to increase the number of monitors as decided by the 
CSCE. The Security Council emphasized that the mission was an example of preventive diplomacy undertaken within the 
framework of the CSCE and had greatly contributed to promoting stability and counteracting the risk of violence in this 
part of the Balkans (Resolution S/RES/855).5 The government in Belgrade did not comply with the provisions of the 
Security Council. Since that time, this body of the United Nations had not taken any activities with the aim to bring back 
stability in Kosovo. 
Facing the problem of the deepening conflict in Kosovo, on 31 March 1998, the UN Security Council issued 
resolution 1160. In that document, the Council condemned the use of excessive force by the Serbian police against 
civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army and other 
groups which supported terrorist activities in Kosovo (Resolution S/RES/1160(1998)).6 In addition, the Security Council 
noted with appreciation all the actions taken by the international community with the aim of restoring peace in Kosovo.7 
The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,8 called upon both the authorities 
in Belgrade, and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community, to enter into a meaningful dialogue on political status 
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issues, without preconditions. In Article 8 of the resolution 1160, the UN Security Council established an embargo on 
arms and related materials of all types: weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment. Under this article, arming 
and training for terrorist activities were forbidden in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo 
(Resolution S/RES/1160).9 The Security Council called upon all states and all international and regional organizations to 
act strictly in conformity with the resolution. In addition, the body decided to create a Security Council committee 
consisting of all the members of the Council. The committee was established in accordance with rule 28 of its Provisional 
Rules of Procedures10 and was responsible for gaining information regarding the actions taken by from all the states 
concerning effective implementation of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 and making periodic reports to the 
Security Council on the basis of this information.11 The Security Council requested the Secretary General of the United 
Nations to provide all necessary assistance to the committee and keep the Council regularly informed on the situation in 
Kosovo and on the implementation of resolution 1160. The Security Council stressed that the situation in Kosovo would 
be reviewed on the basis of reports submitted by the Secretary General of the United Nations. At the end of the 
resolution, the Council emphasized that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were obliged to cooperate 
with the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, which had been gathering information related to the 
violence in Kosovo. The UN Security Council also affirmed that progress in resolving political and human rights issues in 
Kosovo would improve the international position of the Republic of Yugoslavia, whereas failure in making constructive 
progress toward the peaceful resolution in the province would lead to consideration of additional measures. 
Although resolution 1160 was established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the document did 
not include a single statement that the situation in Kosovo might be posing a threat to international peace and security. 
This was probably caused by the fact that resolution 1160 was a compromise between Western states on one side, and 
Russia and China on the other. The two latter countries avoided being involved in integral issues of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. That was the reason why during the voting, the Chinese representative abstained, whereas the Russian 
ambassador, stressed that Russia had some doubts about this resolution, even though he decided to vote for it. 
Resolution 1160 turned out to be insufficient. Even more so, that in spring 1998 the fights among Serbian and 
Albanian became more intense. The reports of the UN Secretary General stated that the situation in Kosovo was grave.12 
In these circumstances, the international community started considering the possibility of a military intervention by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
The lack of progress in peace negotiations, as well as the deterioration of the conflict, resulted on the 
establishment, on 23 September 1998, of the UN Security Council resolution 1199. This document included a statement 
that the situation in Kosovo was a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council expressed its concern 
about the rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation across Kosovo. In addition, the Council condemned all acts of 
violence by any party, and emphasized that violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 were still evident. 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council demanded all parties to cease 
hostilities immediately and maintain a ceasefire in the province. What is more, the Council insisted on the authorities in 
Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with 
international involvement. The Security Council of the United Nations also stressed that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia should have implemented all the measures which were contained in the Contact Group statement of 12 June 
1998.13 In resolution 1199, the Security Council also recalled the obligations of all states to abide the prohibitions 
imposed by resolution 1160 and called upon them to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. 
The Secretary General of the United Nations again was obliged to inform the Security Council on the compliance with the 
resolution. 
It should be noted that resolution 1199 did not include a statement of military intervention in the case of the parties 
do not conform to the obligations. Russia and China opposed the resolution. Russia only supported a political settlement 
of the conflict and claimed that the actions taken by resolution 1199 were in line with the Russian point of view. China, 
however, did not use the veto, and instead abstained from voting for the resolution. 
Resolution 1199 was a matter of importance. The NATO supported it, especially the United States and Great 
Britain, who stated that the lack of implementation of this document’s provisions would be a basis for launching a NATO 
military operation, which was the reason why the international community was impatiently waiting for the report of the 
Secretary General. 
The report of Kofi Annan, who was then the Secretary General of the United Nations, was published on 3 October 
1998. Kofi Annan stressed that the report was created based on information provided by the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Contact Group, and 
individual states. By taking into account these sources, the Secretary General was able to determine that the situation in 
Kosovo did not change. In his report, Kofi Annan stated that although in the last days of September 1998 the number of 
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fights dropped, Kosovo was still a place where hostilities were visible. Fighting in Kosovo resulted in mass displacements 
of civilian population and destruction of villages (Report of the Secretary General S/1998/912).14 The Secretary General 
also noted violation of human rights, including killings and kidnapping, as well as the poor humanitarian situation in 
Kosovo. On the other hand, Kofi Annan welcomed the conclusions of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 
These conclusions were adopted on 28 September 1998 and regarded the resolution of all humanitarian problems in 
Kosovo. The National Assembly also decided that the Government of Serbia would continue to cooperate with both the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and UNHCR.14 In the report, Kofi Annan condemned not only actions taken by 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but also all the activities of the Albanian side. The report of the UN Secretary General 
was not unequivocal. Due to this fact, it was not a sufficient basis for a NATO military intervention. 
The signing of an agreement by the United States Special Envoy – Richard Holbrook and President Slobodan 
Milosevic on 13 October 1998 was a milestone on the road to stabilization in Kosovo.15 However, the Security Council 
decided to establish another resolution. Resolution 1203 was adopted on 24 October 1998. In this document, the Security 
Council welcomed agreements providing for the OSCE to establish a Verification Mission in Kosovo, 16 as well as an 
agreement providing the establishment of an Air Verification Mission by the NATO in the province.17 The Security Council 
again emphasized its support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem, which in its opinion would include an 
enhanced status for Kosovo with a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration. The 
Council condemned all the violations of resolution 1160 and expressed its concern about the closure, by the authorities of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of independent media outlets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition, the 
Council required both the Serbian government in Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to fully comply with 
resolutions 1160 and 1199, as well as to fully cooperate with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo. The Council once 
again stressed that lack of a peaceful resolution in Kosovo was a threat to international peace and stability. In the article 
15 of the resolution, the Security withdrew the embargo on guns and other military materials, which were used by the 
OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo.18 Resolution 1203, also obliged the Secretary General to submit reports to the 
Security Council regarding the implementation of the resolution. Resolution 1203 turned out to be controversial. The 
Russian ambassador – Sergey Lavrov – emphasized in a speech that the government in Belgrade made some progress 
in the process of resolving the conflict in Kosovo. Russia claimed that this resolution did not take into account this kind of 
progress. What is more, Russia did not agree with the statement that the conflict in Kosovo was still a threat to peace and 
security. Sergey Lavrov did not support the sentence connected with the problem of free media in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Taking into account these arguments, Russia, as well as China, decided to abstain from casting a vote. 
The first report of the UN Secretary General, which was related to the compliance with resolution 1203 and two 
previous resolutions, was announced on 12 November 1998. The Secretary General of the UN emphasized that: 
 
The accord reached by the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, and the United States 
Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, on 13 October 1998, as well as the agreements signed in Belgrade on 15 October 
1998 between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE, have contributed toward defusing the immediate crisis 
situation in Kosovo and have created more favorable conditions for a political settlement (Report of the Secretary General 
S/1998/1068).19 
 
However, the report was announced after the signing of the agreement of 13 October 1998. It included some 
information which was gained by the Mission of the United Nations, and was considered as a significant proof that the 
conflict in Kosovo had not ended.20 In the same document, the UN Secretary General did not support the idea of 
establishing a permanent UN mission in Kosovo. He only stated that, at the request of the Security Council, the UN could 
establish temporary observation missions which would examine the situation in Kosovo. 
Another report by Kofi Annan was announced on 24 December 1998. In it, the Secretary General alarmed that the 
situation in the province had become more serious. More than 50 persons died during massive attacks in Kosovo (Report 
of the Secretary General S/1998/1221).21 Despite the European Union’s and the United States’ attempts to find a solution, 
there was no progress in the political dialogue.  
In January 1999, the situation in Kosovo came to a boiling point. Then, journalists and the OSCE verified the 
discovery, in the village of Racak, of the bodies of 45 civilians (Weller, 2008),22 who had been executed – apparently by 
Serbian forces.23 The Secretary General, in his report of 30 January 1999, shed also some light on the massacre in 
Racak, claiming that the situation in Kosovo was profoundly serious. In the view of the Secretary General, the conflict in 
Kosovo was likely to cause an outbreak of civil war in the province. At the same time, the NATO warned both parties that 
should not political settlement be made, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would start a military intervention. 
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On 6 February 1999, the Contact Group organized peace negotiations in Rambouillet. The delegation of Albanian 
signed the agreement of 18 March 1999; which was rejected by the representatives of Serbia.24 In this situation, the 
military intervention of the NATO became a real option. The Security Council of the United Nations could not have 
adopted any resolutions which would legitimate the military actions supported by the United Nations. The deadlock was 
caused by Russia and China. These two countries declared they would veto this kind of a resolution, which resulted in the 
member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization claim that UN Security Council resolutions 1160, 1199, 1203, 
based on the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and the indications of the threat to international peace and 
security were sufficient to establish military operations. The lack of a  Serbian-Albanian agreement, as well as the further 
steps of the UN Security Council, resulted in the NATO air campaign in the territory of Kosovo on 24 March 1999. 
 
3. The UN Security Council facing the situation in Kosovo after the NATO military intervention 
 
During the NATO military intervention in the province, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1239 of 14 May 1999. 
The resolution had a primarily humanitarian dimension. The UN Security Council expressed its concern about the 
humanitarian catastrophe in and around Kosovo, which also caused an enormous influx of Kosovo refugees into Albania, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other countries (Resolution 
S/RES/1239(1999)).25 The Council also emphasized that the states, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
and international organizations, should coordinate humanitarian relief activities in Kosovo. The Security Council called 
upon the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to enable the United Nations, as well as all other 
humanitarian personnel to operate in Kosovo, as well as other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the end of 
resolution 1239, the UN Security Council warned both sides that the absence of a political solution to the crisis would 
continue to make the humanitarian situation worse. The resolution was also adopted, China and Russia abstaining, as 
the countries decided not to support the humanitarian assistance of the UNHCR and other organizations in the province. 
The official military intervention of the North Atlantic Organization lasted until 20 June 1999. On 3 June 1999, 
Belgrade decided to accept a peaceful settlement. On 10 June 1999, the Security Council adopted, with the support of 
Russia, resolution 1244. In this resolution, the Security Council decided to deploy international civil and security presence 
under United Nations auspices. The Council authorized the Secretary General with the assistance of relevant 
organizations26 to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo – the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK, Mandate).27 The mission was divided into two components. The NATO was responsible for military 
issues, whereas the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations coordinated the civilian 
component of the mission. The mission was responsible for: 
 
Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement of substantial autonomy and self-governance in Kosovo, 
performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required, organizing and overseeing the 
development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government, supporting the reconstruction of 
the key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction, protecting and promoting human rights etc (Resolution 
S/RES/1244).28 
 
Resolution 1244 also stated that the mission was responsible for facilitating a political process designed to 
determine Kosovo’s future status. The resolution did not precisely describe the future status of Kosovo. The document did 
not mention a future independence of the province. Resolution 1244 guaranteed only autonomy for Kosovo, within the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At that time, the future status of Kosovo was a question mark.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The crisis in Kosovo became turned out as a striking example of the UN Security Council’s weakness. Although the 
deepening of the conflict in Kosovo happened in 1998, the UN Security Council, by the adaptation of resolution 855 in 
1993, proved that since that year, the stability in Kosovo had been in danger. Taking into account the fact that resolution 
1160 was adopted in 1998, the Council had been avoiding the issue of Kosovo for almost five years. 
The UN Security Council, under Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, is responsible for maintaining 
international peace and security. All the resolutions which were proclaimed in 1998 were the outcome of compromise. 
Without that compromise, it is highly possible that the Security Council could not have adopted any of them. That was the 
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In this situation, the NATO member states, while establishing the military intervention, broke the Charter’s 
provisions, thereby making the military intervention illegal in the light of international law. 
On the other hand, there is the question what the international community should have done in this kind of 
situation. Kosovo was a place where human rights were violated. The deadlock in the Security Council caused the 
spreading of the humanitarian disaster. In these circumstances, the NATO had two options: to break international law, or 
observe human rights being violated. The casus of the Kosovo conflict once again showed that the system of the United 
Nations requires changes. In contrast, the UN Security Council does not have the practical tools to solve conflicts dividing 
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S/1998/912, accessed on June 22, 1998 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/912.  
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also organized consultations with local and international non-governmental organizations and governmental 
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